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- 4  PE 50.. 829/finThe Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European
the following motion for a resolution6 "together with explanatory sta
MOTION FOR A P~SOLUTION
....
on European political cooperation
~he European Par liamen t
noting the development of poli tical coopera'ti()n machiner:l between
over recent years 
- considering that the links between the Fo:ceign l.vJ.i,nisters of ,the Nj
the European Parliament must be improved and strengthened, particl
with a view to providing the European Parliament with wider scope
exercising influence over political cooperation 
- regretting the instances of failure to coordina te the pcsi  ons 
action of the Nine Member States of the coromunitYJ" 1?ar'ticularly i!
cases in the General Asse!TLbly of the united Nation~~ and in other
international fora
expresslng its concern at the lack of subst,~lnt:i Vf.2:  anc? up-to-date
given to the European Parliament by the Foreign Ministers of the
concerning measures of joint foreign pol cy 
~ Requests the Governments of ,the Member States
1.. to ensure that the European ParliaIRent 
.:;
s fully informed concern,
all joint foreign policy decisions 'taken by the Nine 
2. to provide Parliament I s Political Affairs CommlttAA, in an appro)
with substantive and up-to-date information concerning the meeti
and acti vi ties of ,the Foreign Ministers of 'the Nine ou,tside ,the
quarterly meetings and subsequent colloquies
5 - PE 50.. t3. to take account of the foreign policy guidelines adop'ted by the
European Par liament 
4. to instruct the Foreign Ministers to submi t a wri tten annual report
on European poli"tical cooperation to ' the European Parliament one
month in advance of the annual debate in Parliament on European
poli tical cooperation 
5. to decide to end the arti ficial distinction between ' Communi ty I and
poli tical cooperation I matters, and, in this respect, to invite
the Commiss on to participate fully in all parts of all political
cooperation meetings 
6. to instruct the Foreign Ministers to seek agree!nent on the political
and related aspects of negotiations with third countries before
the Council of Ministers gives a mandate to the Commission to open
negotiations and to establish this mandate in the light of an
orientation debate held by the Parliament
70 to ensure that the Commission represents the Communi ty in all
major flultilateral economic negotiations following agreement by the
Foreign !linisters on the political and related aspects of such
negotiations 
B 0 Instructs its President to forward this resolution together with
the report 0 f its cornmi ttee to the Council and the Commission of the
European Communities and to the Parliaments and Governments of the
Member States.
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
INTRODUCTION
lo The First Report on Political Cooperation was adopted by the Foreign
Ministers of the Six in 1970.. Since then, the Foreign Ministers of the
Nine have approv9d a Second Report on European Poli tical Cooperation (EPC)
which established improved procedures for the coordination of the foreign
policy of the Community Member States. The Parliament  s own most recent
report on political cooperation adopted by the Political Committee was
drafted by its Papporteur, Mr Mommersteeg, in early 1973o
20 In December 1974 the Heads of Government, meeting in Paris, approved
the creation of the European Council, which met first in Dublin in March
1975. Mr Tindernans reported in December 1975 to the European Council on
European Union ~ and made specific proposals on political coo~ration.
Politica 1 cooperation has enjoyed some successes but has also suffered
significant failures since 1973. It has, however  been going through a
process of slow expansion welcomed by several governments of Member States.
The moment therefore seems opportune for the Political Affairs Committee
again to consider the objectives, structure and working of EPC and the
participation of European parliamentarians in carrying out their duty of
controll ing- EPC 
CHAPTER  STRUCTURE AND MACHINERY OF POLITICAL COOPERATIO
Operation of Political Coo2eration
4.. The Political Committee (' Davignon I Committee) now meets almost every
month $ and in addi tion is convened when its members are attending meetings,
such as the United Nations General Assembly or 
th~ European Council  its
meetings are increas ing in frequency  The working parties of experts
established by the S0cond Report discuss matters of immediate importance
and also problems with long-term implications, in which cases their nature
is that of a  planning meeting I .. The communications system between the
Foreign Ministries provides for instant communication of political
information between Foreign Ministries, rather than through Member States 
Embassies  The latter now  however, appoint one official to follow
political cooperation, and these officials increasingly meet with the director of politi2al affairs of the Foreign Ministry of that Member State..
See Annex 1 for summary of contents of First and Second Reports on
Political Cooperation
Known a s I COREUNET I 
through COREUNET 
Some 500 telegrams a month are now communicated
7 - PE 50 .829/fin 5. The Commission sees most of the telegrams exchanged on the
COREUNET system. The Commission is  rese almost all parts of all
political cooperation meetings and is invited to take part in some meetings
of the working parties, but the Council secretariat 
is never present.
Although the Commission is invited to  ive 1 S V1ews at such meet1ngs, it
does not  artici ate  cis1ons. It 1S the Pres1dency which plays the
prime role in coordinating political coo eration discuSS1ons and providing
an element of continuity during the six-month period concerned.
~ures in Political Coo?eration
6. The advances made in constructing the machinery of political cooper-
ation are welcome as far as they go. But the widening and intensification
of the Community I s foreign relations and failures of the Nine to cooperate
effectively in the field of foreign policy lead inevitably to the conclusion
that new machinery is necessary. The major failure was not responding
effectively or ln a united way to the situation created by the Israeli-Arab
war of October 1973 and the consequent oil supply crisis.
The specific failures in political cooperation are dealt with in a later
part of this Report, but relate essentially to lack of cooperation on
Mediterranean policy, and in particular on Cyprus and the Lebanon, to the
recognition of the hepublic of Angola and to voting on important resolutions
of the united Nations General Assembly.
7 0 The shortcomings in the structure of EPC are several, but derive
principally from the fact that the Davignon procedures are operated by
Foreign Ministers and their officials, who in spite of their European
vocation, are conditioned to furthering their own country I s objectives
and interests in foreign affairs. This fact imposes a fundamental limita-
tion on the potential degree of coordination which is possible in the
interests of the Nine or the Community. Even if the political will to
achieve coordination exists on the part of several Member States, the
whole opera tion of the Davignon procedure leads to decis ions achieved on the
basis of the lowest common denominator of national interests, ~ rgely 
interpreted DY foreign ministry officials.
- 8 - PE 50. 829/finWeaknesses in Davignon procedures
8. A major problem in the machinery for political cooperation lies in the
difficulty of assuring continuity in the work of such specialist groups of
officials as exist in discussing the present and future situation in a
given field.. But some groups, such as the "Africa II group3 do manage to
meet frequently and thus to achieve some element of conti nuity. As the
Commission stated in their report on European Unio~1  Hitherto, political
cooperation has seldom led to anything more than the Community reacting to
events.. For example there has to date been little success in
anticipating the possible outcome of events, particularly in Africa,
within the machinery of EPC 
9.. Linked v'ith  this shortcoming is the lack of continuity in the conduct
of politica'- cooperation.. The "Presidency changes every six months, and at
each change the Chairmen of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, of the Council,
of the Political Committee and of the expert working parties are all changed.
The operation of the machinery  in toto is entrusted to a different Foreign
Ministry, wit~ all the potential for disruption in methods of work whicl\
this entails. A stronger element of continuity is essential in order to
render the operation of the machinery more efficient 
Tindemans ore ig.!l...2o 1 i 
10. Chapter II of the Tindemans Report on European Union~ submitted to the
European Councilp essentially concerns the external relations of the Unlon
11. Mr Tindemans makes two important institutional proposals  First;
that the distinction between ministerial meetings dealing with political
cooperation and those dealing with Treaty subject matter should be ended:
I in order to decide on a policy the Ministers nlust be able to consider al.
aspects of the problems within the Council ~ I Secondi that the creation of
single decision-making centre S (the Council at the level of Foreign
Ministers) WGuid avoid confusion between I ColTImunity activities I and political
cooperation I activities  The creation of a political cooperation office,
as proposed later in the present report; could help to realise both the
proposals ~ade by Mr Tindemans  In practice, EPC items are already often
placed on the agenda of ordinary Council meetings  But when they come up
for discussio~ although the Ministers remain the same~ their advisers, for
these agenda itemsg change and become national foreign office officials.
12., The Tindemans report was considered by the European Council at its
meeting at The Hague on 29/30 November 1976  In the statement issued at
the end of the meeting the members of the European Council stated that  the
general lines of the comments by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs . on the
different chapters of the Tindemans report were  approved I by them  The
Supplement 5/75 to Bulletin of European Communities paragraph 
Supplement No . 1/76 tCJ) Bulletin of European Communities..
.--
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constitutes a welcome p.recederrl: for the future" It should also be remembered
that some MembeL States were against any participation in the London sumn1i t
by the President of the Commission acting on behalf of the CommunitY6 at allft
Foreiqn 2olicy and security policy
15. In Chapter II of his Report on European Union Mr Tindemans includes a
significant sect ion on security questions  Looking to the future of
European political cooperation (in the context of European Union) he
states: I No foreign policy can disregard threats, whether actual or poten-
tial, and the ability to meet them  Security cannot, therefore, be left
outside the scope of the European Union I 0 Exchanges of viewB between the
Nine on specific problems in defence matters and on European aspects of
multilateral security negotiations could take the form of the national
defence ministers joining together wi th the Nine Foreign Ministers at the
quarterly meeting of the Conference  to discuss the security aspects of
foreign affairs problems, wherever appropriate  Likewise representatives
of national defence ministries could participate in working pa~ties at
official levelo
16. It is understood that at present Member Governments are reluctant to
raise defence issues within the political cooperation procedure  since those
which participate in the work of the North Atlantic Alliance and 8 concerning
arms procurement cooperation  in the work of the Independent European
Planning Group, consider that these are at present the most appropriate fora
for the consideration of defence and procurement questions  These are
however matters to which the Foreign Ministers  wi th their defence colleagues,
should address themselves with a view to widening discussions under political
cooperation.
Relations with the USA
170 Links have developed over the years between European political cooper-
ation and the US Government concerning some aspects of foreign policy 
particular it appears that the US Department of State has established the
practice of consulting the President-in-Office of the Council (who is also
the Chairman of the Conference of Foreign Ministers) before each quarterly
meeting of the Foreign Ministers concerning questions of common interest to
the Uni tea States and the Nine 
lB. Further, the US State Department and the Foreign Ministries of the
Nine have apparently tried to coordinate their approaches concerning the
Cyprus problem and Rhodesia 
- 11 - PE 50A 829/fin19. While it SE:ems both sensible and advanotageous for the Foreign
Min~ ters of the Nine to introduce flexibili ty into their procedures by
consulting friendly powers, such as the United Statesp where appropriate;
it may be relevant to raise the question of parliamentary accountability
in this context. Whereas the Foreign Ministers are accountable~ although
at present to a limited degree only~ to the European Parliament a) throug-h
colloquies with the Parliament' s Political Committee and b) through
parliamentary questions and debates to what extent can the US element 
such consultation be made accountableq if at alII to the European
Parliament? IL is interesting, in this context, to note that bo h the
Japanese and united States governmen'ts have adopted the practice of
strengthening their diplomatic representation in the capital of the Member
state of the Community holding the Presidency of the Council and the
Chairmanship of the Conference of Foreign Ministers  But the problem
remains of how accountability of the Foreign Ministers to Parliament for
political cooperation between the Nine and other countries is to be ensured.
The position of the CoTI~ission
20.. Since 1973 the Commission has become considerably more involved in
the working of political cooperationo It acts for the Community as such
on the economic cooperation matters contained in Basket II of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and has also coordinaoted the views
of the Western countries in this field  It acts for the Community in all
the technical sectors of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which comprise the great
part of the fj eld of discussion  But it is, once again, the Presidency
which plays the prime rolejl for the Community  in the management of the
Euro-Arab Dialogue  The Presidency speaks for the Community as a whole,
and on occasion a President-in-Office has invited the previous President
and the next following President to a meeting to form a working team with
him as a  troika  ~ thus providing continuity on the Community side 
In addition the Commission attends meetings of Ministers on EPC and of
the colloquies held between them and the Political Affairs Committee of
the Parliament.. It is also concerned in other areas of political
cooperation, such as Cyprusr the Near East, and relations with the United
States the latter always appear as an aspect of other relations.. But
as the Col1lJnissiOrl is present at EPC meetings in the capacity of c guest'
it considers that it must be discreet in its use of the information 
abtains there 
21 .. As EPC d~velops, and becomes gradually a part of the framework of
Con~unity actiong the role of the Co~TIission will acquire greater importance
in EPC This is to be welcomedF particularly in view of the intention of
the new Commission to be animated by greater political awareness 
executing its economic and technical responsibilities under the Treaties~
In particular -':he Commission is strongly placed to press the Foreign ivlinisters
- 12  k. - (.J '1 
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and the European Council to take account of community policies in making
decisions in the foreign policy field, and also progressively to ensure the
removal of the false distinction between EPC and Community matters. It is
vital that the Commission should set itself these objectives and should do
everything in its power to achieve them. At the same time, however, the
commission I s responsibilities to Parliament in these areas will require
re e lnl lon.
A political Cooperation Office
22. The experience of six years  working of political cooperation and in
particular of its working in the last three years leads more and more
insistently to the conclusion that a permanent office is required, not only
to organise cooperation at the existing level, but to provide for wider
cooperation, a higher degree of political content in planning future policies
and in making parliamentary control effective.
23. Before discussing the functions of an agency for political cooperat ion,
it is worth recalling briefly the discussions in 1960-62 at Heads of
Government, Foreign Minister and official level between the Six on the
proposals for  political union I . 2 Although the Six C~mmunity Member
States failed to reach agreement on such a union, t~ French Government on
the one hand and the five other Community Governments on the other
elaborated diff~ring proposals for an institutional framework, which retain
some relevance.
24. Both texts sought the coordination and unification of the foreign and
defence policies of Member States but. that of  the Five I insisted that a
common defence policy must either be  in the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance I or must  contribute to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance 
I .
Both texts envisaged the creation of a Commfttee of Foreign Mini sters and a
Committee of Mi~isters of Defence. A  poli tical Committee I was to be set
up in order to prepare the discussions of the Council of Ministers and
supervise their implementation. It was to be composed of senior officials
from each Member State, and the French Government proposed that it sh0uld
be situated in Paris~
See paragr~ph 48 below
2 For 
a detailed account  these proposals see I The negotiations on
Pol i tical Un ion  PEP  London 1962.
13. - PE 50.829/finFunction of new Political Cooperation Office
25. What then should be the functions of a new body for political
cooperation? It must first coordinate and plan the foreign policy of the
Communi ty and of the Nine Member States in the short- medium- and long-
term . In order to do this # the Office must monitor the current situation
in each of th~ existing fields of Community and foreign policy activities
throughout the world  and must forecast events as effectively as 
possible. The Office must then , on the basis of policy studies, put
forward proposa ls for the conduct of common policies to the Nine Foreign
Mlnlsters, to COREPER # an to the European Council. In exercising
these functions, it should ensure close coordination in the foreign policy
field between these bodies and the European Commission. Perhaps the most
important of theue functions in the short-term would be to ensure the
gradual disappearance of any distinction or division between Community
foreign policy and the foreign policies of Member States.
Structure of the new body
260 The Office could take one of a number of forms, but the following one
seems the most realistic in present circumstances: administratively it
should be responsible to the Secretary General of the Council, but politic-
ally it should work on the instructions of the Foreign Ministers and possibly
on the instructions of the European Council. It would be funded from the
Community Budget. It would work equally closely with the Council and the
Commission, either by supplying representatives to Committees and working
groups of COREPER and the Commission, or by inviting representatives of
these bodies to attend its own working units. The Office would norma lly
establish a working group to cover each of the principal fields in which 
common foreign policy or coordinated action by the Member States had been
achieved or was necessary 0 The Office should be si ted at Brussels. The Office would replace the present EPC machinery at the level of Officials. 27. In order to emphasise the shift towards the development of a foreign
policy for the Community Q the Office should recruit staff on a different
basis from that of the present Political Committeeo While some senior
officials should continue to be drawn from the national Foreign Ministries,
a proportion of the staff should be drawn from the other Community
institutions. There could also be an advisory role for expert observers
of Community foreign affairs to assist with policy studies in specific
fields or on defence 
The Committee of Permanent Representatives, who are the national
Ambassadors to the Communi ty in Brussels. Its task is to prepare
decisions takEn by the Council  Its members also act as guardians and
promoters of national interests 
For example, those working in institutes of internati onal or strategic affairs and possibly officials from OECD, NATO and WEU.
- 14 - PE 50.829/fin28. Then there is the all-important question of the role that the
European Parliament should play in the formulation of a joint European
for~ gn policy. First it must be recalled that both in the past and at
present parliamentarians of the Member States have not been adequately
informed, either in their national Parliaments or in the European Parliament,
of the evolution of the foreign policy initiatives decided upon by the
Foreign Ministers of the Nine. Foreign policy decis ions of the Nine have
been prepared by national foreign ministry officials, and taken by the
Foreign Ministers  in camera and parliamentarians have themselves been, and
are still, confronted with a series of  faits accomplis Not only are
parliamentarians not informed of foreign policy decisions taken by the
until after the press has already been informed  but, which is more
Nine
important, they have no opportunity at all of influencing the decisions
taken by the Foreign Ministers or of making an effective input into the
closed and secret decis ion-making procedures of the Foreign Ministers 
This is undemocratic and unsatisfactory and prevents parliamentaria~ from
carrying out their duty of controlling the Executi ve 
29. In the future the Foreign Ministers must be prepared not only to give
adequate informntion to parliamentarians concerning the evolution of their
joint foreign policy proposals, but also to open up the decision-making
process to allow the European Parliament to influence and help to shape the
joint foreign policy initiatives taken. Further there is the question of
the accountability to the European Parliament of the Political Cooperation
Office for its worko Since those working for the Office will be civil
servants acting according to the instructions given to them by the Fore ign
Ministers, its staff cannot be directly accountable to the Parliament 
It is, therefore, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States who must be
directly answerable to the European Parliament and to its Political
Committee for the coordination and planning of a joint European foreign
policy of Community and Member Sta-tes in the short- medium- and long-term.
30. Another proposal in the field of an Office for Political Cooperation
has been put forward recently; which is designed to apply particularly to
negotiations between the Community and the COMECON countries e - Before
the Council gives a mandate to the Commission to embark on negotiations
with a third country or outside body, it is proposed that the Council should
first instruct the Nine Foreign Ministers to seek agreement on the political
and security implications of the negotiations  The Commission Sh ould be
invited to attend such discussions at Foreign Minister and Political Co-
operation Office levelo It would also be useful to seek guidance and
information from NATO before arriving at decisions involving questions of
security.
I EEC: The road to better political cooperation 
I ~
January 1976 
The World Today I :
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MATTERS
CRA PTER I I I
Attitude of the Six
31. The texts of the Communique of The Hague Summit of December 1969 and
of the First Report on political cooperation indicate that the Heads of
Government and the Foreign Ministers of the Six at that time do not appear
to have envisaged any distinction between political cooperation and
Communi ty matters. The former stated in The Hague communique that  the
European Communi ties remain the original nucleus from which European Unity
has been developed and intensified I . The Foreign Ministers thought that
their proposals for machinery of political cooperation should be based on
two facts. The first was that
in line w~th the spirit of the Preambles to the Treaties of Paris
and Rome, tangible form should be given to the will for a political
union, which has always been a force for the progress of the
European Communities 
The second fact was that
implementation of the common policies being introduced or already
in force requires corresponding developments in the specifically
political sphere, so as to bring nearer the day when Europe can
s peak wi th one voice t .
Attitude of the Nine
32. The dichotomy between Community matters and political cooperation
appears first to have been set out formally in the Second Report on political
cooperation, for there appears the statement
The political cooperation machinery, which deals on the inter-
governmental level with problems of international politics, is
distinct from and additional to the activities of the institutions
of the Community, which are based on the juridical commitments
undertaken by the Member States in the Treaty of Rome. 
It is further explained that political cooperation machinery  is responsible
for dealing with questions of current interest and where possible for
formulating common medium- and long-term positions I and must keep in mind
the effects on Community policies.
First Report, paragraphs 7 and 8.
No. 11/70.
See Bulletin of the Communities,
Bulletin of the European Co~~unities, No. 9, 1973, section 1201,
Appendix, paragraph 120
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33. Strong opposition has been expressed to the artificial distinction
between political cooperation and Community matters. First, the resolution
on European Union adopted by the European Parliament in July 1975, states
that, in the field of foreign policy, I New procedures must be developed to
enable the Community to speak with a single voice in international
" ,
po lCles  Second, the Commission, in its Report on European Union of
June 1975, states that what must be done is  to complete the elimination of
the frequently artificial distinction between Community activities and
, ,
matters for political cooperatlone
34. Third, Mr Tindemans, in his Report on European Union, proposed that
the European Council should end  the distinction which still exists today
between ministerial meetings which deal with political cooperation and
those which deal with the subjects covered by the Treaties. The
declaration by the European Council of November 1976 on this Report is now
being studied by the Foreign Ministers, and also by the Political Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament 
The need to end s~aration
35. The case for putting an end to the separation between Community and
poli tical c0operation matters can be buttressed by several concrete examples.
The President-in-Office has been criticised in the European Parliament for
explaining in so~e detail the policies of the Nine on Southern Africa, the
recognition of the Transkei  Rhodesia and Namibia  without once mentioning
the existence of the Convention of Lome 4  The latter was equally not
mentioned in the Declarations by the Nine on Africa of February 1976 or
April 1977 5
36. Relations between the Community and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
are conducted on a variety of levels in a multitude of bodies at present.
The Council and Commission are responsible for official relations with the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in economic matters.
OJ CD 179/28 of 6. 1975
Supplement 5/75, paragraph 65, to Bulletin of the European Communities
Supplement 1/76, Part II  A, to Bulletin of European Communities
OJ Annex No. 209, Debates of the European Parliament, November 1976,
pp. 95-
PE 44. 088 and PE 48. 673
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on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) while the Council and
Commission are responsible for Basket II (economic cooperation) yet the
Community as such signed the Helsinki Declaration as one body  In the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations in Vienna, neither the
Nine Foreign Ministers nor the Community are represented as such, but cer-
tain Member States are present. In the field of trade relations the
Commission is completely within its rights in deciding unilatera lly whether
or not to sell Cornmun~ty stocks of food to the USSR. On the other hand
relations with the USA are handled by the Nine Foreign Ministers as regards
foreign affairs and by the Council and Commission in regard to trade and
economic relations.
37 . These few examples - and many more exist - indicate the clamant need
to bring the responsibility for the conduct of all the Community s external
relations, whether political, economic or commercial, under the aegis of one
insti tution or organised body 
The role of the European Council
38. As Mr Tindemans recognised, the argument about the artificial distinc-
tion between Communi ty and foreign policy matters has been complicated by
the appearance of the  European Council'  This body has now been in
existence for just ovaL two years; and its operation has already been the
subject of proposals for change by its initiator, President Giscard
Estaingo It was set up I to ensure progress and overall consistency in
the activities of the Communities and in the work on political cooperatlon
and is apparently equally competent to discuss and to take decisions on
purely Community matters (such as the regional fund and employment policy)
and on foreign policy matters (such as political relations with Portugal
and Rhodesia) 
39. If the European Council is to be  institutionalised I and to become,
without actually being enshrined in the Treaties by formal amendment, part
of the framework of the Community itself, it would seem logical to acknow-
ledge the consequences of this development  On this basis  the Council of
Foreign Ministers, acting as  initiators and coord inators I 2 
(i $  as a
proposer in some cases, a filter in others, and an executive agent in others)
for the Europea~ Council  should be competent to deliberate and to take
decisions in all the fields of policy covered by the European Council 
If this logical step were taken, the Council would have been endowed de  facto
wi th a competence to consider and to reach conclus ions on foreign policy 
well as on Community matters 
Bulletin of the European Communities , No ~ 12/74 ~ section 1104, para ~ 2.
Bulletin of the European Communities  No ~ 12/74  section 1104  para & 30
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Counci l, the bodies working together on foreign policy cooperat ion should
equally be at the disposal of the guroperan Council;J t1lrol1qll t ho modium
of the Counc i 1 of Ministers  rhusg if for example the European Council
proposed -to consider the Community s political and economic relationships
with the USA or with the Mediterranean countries  COREPER , the Commission
and the Office for Political Cooperation could all be called upon to provide
information, s~udies, advice and alternative policy options for the
European Council directly 
CHAPTER IV THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL COOPERATION
Existing Parliamentary 2rocedures
41.. The First Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on
political cooperation (the Davignon Heport) established certain links
between the machinery of political cooperation and the European
Parliament  The Report set up the system of s ix-monthly colloquies
between the Minj sters (sic) and the Political Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament  to discuss questions which are the subject of consul-
tations in the framework of foreign policy cooperation 1 " The meetings
were to be infonnal  it  to ensure that both sides could express their views
free ly" In addition, once each year the President-in-Office of the
Council was to provide the European Parliarnen"t with a progress report on
politica 1 cooperation"
42  The Second Report on EPC of July 1973 provided far four colloquies
between Ministers and the political Affairs Committee of the per year
European Parliament ~ 2 The Committee (the political Directors of the
national foreign ministries) was invited to draw to the attention of the
Ministers in advance  proposals adopted by the European Parliament on
foreign policy question (Part II, paragraph 10) The annual oral report
to Parliament was to continue 
Developments since 1973
43  Certain itlelcome developmen.ts have been achieved in relations bet\J\Teen
the Foreign Ministers and the European Parliament since the Second Report
in 1973" First, at the Summit Conference in Paris itl December 1974, the
Heads or Government agreed tha-t the Presidency of the Cou.Dcil would answer
questions on political cooperation put by Members of the European
Parliament In February 1975 the Foreign Ministers agreed that
Bulletin of "tLe European Communities  i1  No 0 11  1970
Ibid ~ No. 9 f 1973, section 1201, Appendix r paragraph 100
Con~unique, paragraph 4 ~ Bulletin of the EEC  No ~ 1~/7 4 ; section 1104 
PE 50..829/finwritten questions under Rule 45 of the Parliament' s Rules . of Procedure, and
oral questions without debate (Rule 46) and with debate (Rule 47) on ' the
activities of political cooperation would be answered by the Presidency.
Some flexibility was however to be exercised in regard to the time-limits
for answers to questlons 
44. On l7 November 1976 Parliament unanimously adopted a motion for
resolution which included provision for the answering by the Presidency at
Question Time of questions on the activities of political cooperation 
The Presidency has since drawn attention to certain difficulties which
could lead to a delay in providing answers to oral questions at Question
Time 3 
45. The procedure for the presentation of an annual oral report on political
cooperation by the Presidency was developed further in October 1973, when
the President-in-Office, Mr K. B. Andersen, agreed that a debate should be
reply held following his statement, to which he made a
procedure has since been followed every year 
This
lffiprovement of exist inq procedures
a) Debates
46. Members of Parliament find themselves at a disadvantage in having to
debate immediately an annual report made orally by the President-in-Office.
It would be a great improvement if a written report on EPC was to be
circulated in all working languages in advance, which Members could tl1en
study before the debate. This would permit a more considered appreciation
by Members of the work of the Foreign Ministers, which in turn would produce
a more balanced dnd informed debate.
47. This procedure should also be extended to cover the work of the
European Council. An oral report on the activities of the European
Council should be submitted to Parliament by the Head of Government of the
Member State holding the Presidency at Parliament' s next session following
each meetlng of the European ounCl
.. 
This report should cover not
only specific Community business but the other general discussions and con-
clusions of the European Council, and political cooperatioTh and
should be followed by a debate. It 
PE 39. 9l6/rev.
Doc. 336/760
PE 48. 542
OJ Annex No. 167, Debates of the European Parliament, p. 84ff.
As has already been suggested by Sir Peter Kirk in his draft report
for the Political Committee on Inter-Institutional Relations.
OJ C 2 9 3/2 3 0 f 13. 12  1976
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this kind, foreign policy activities of the European Council, which have
so far been accountable to the Parliament and which have not been coveredl
the annual reports on political cooperation activities.
b) Information  from the Commission
48.. As has been sho~ln above, the Commission participate in political
cooperation to a much greater extent than five years ago: it is also
closely involved in the CSCE and the Euro-Arab Dialogue, both of which
major elements of political cooperation policy bridge the rapidly narrowi
divide between political cooperation and Cownunity matters as such.. Howev
attempts by Parliament I s Political Affairs Coo~ittee to obtain informatio
about the Commission I s involvement in political cooperation have been alm
entirely fruitless.. If the Commission is to adopt a more political
stance and to yive real assistance to Parliament , it must ensure that
Parliamentary Committees are fully and regularly informed on matters of
foreign policy which impinge upon the Commission I s areas of responsibi lit~
c)  Colloquies
49., The Political. Affairs Comrni ttee of the European Parliament has on
several occasions criticised details of the procedure for holding four
colloquies per year with the Presidency of the Foreign Ministers..
Ithough the Second Report stated that  the Ministers  would meet with
Members of the Political Affairs Commi ttee, in practice it has been
exceptional for more than one Minister to be present  The Com~mittee havE
brought this situation to the attention of successive Presidents-in-OffiCE
wi thout any improvement having been achieved  It is obvious 1y desirable
that the Corruni ttee should have the benefi t of the expertise and experiencE
of as many Foreign Ministers as possible r as well as those of the Commissj
in order to deepen their knowledge and understanding of the development 
EPC.,
50.. The Commi ttee have also been obliged to cri ticise the delay by
successive Presidents-in-Office in informing them of the results of the
latest meeting of the Foreign Ministers  Delays have on occasion been
measured in weeks 1 so that very often events have overtaken the Minis ters 
discuss ions. This is patently unsatisfactory to t,he Committee  11  and li ttl
improvement has been obtained as a result of its protests despite the
Committee i s willingness to meet the convenience of the President-in-Office
in regard to the venue of the colloquy  It is therefore proposed that
- 21 - FE 50. 82 9/fincolloquies should in future be held  immediately after a substantive Foreign
Ministers  meeting on political cooperation has ended, and after any
subsequent Press Conference has concluded.. Members of a directly-elected
Parliament will be more easily able to attend such meetings e at which they
should be able to question the Foreign Ministers freely on their discussions.
51. A third major ground of criticism of colloquy procedures by the
Political Affairs Committee has been the paucity of information given by
the Presidency  Members have repeatedly been obliged to complain to the
President-in-Office that abnost all the information he has given them has
already been published in the Press. As the Commi"ttee has always
respected the confidential nature of the colloquies, the continued
unwillingness of successive Presidents-in~Dffice to impart confidential
information to it indicates a refusal to associate the Parliament more
closely with the work of the Presidency..
52  The Committee has also made specific criticisms of the short time set
aside by the President-in-Office for meeting it.. Frequently, questions
by Members have had to be restricted, or the reply by the Pres idency has
been cut short by lack of time.. This problem has prevented the proper
development of the colloquies as a useful element in relations between the
European parliamer t and the Foreign Ministers.. In future, therefore,
adequate time s:10uld be set aside by the Presidency for colloquies with the
Political Committee.. During Question Time in Parliament it is essential
that the Chairman-in-Office provides an answer to oral questions put to
him on EPC so that a debate can ensue if desired by Members..
53  The Second Report on political cooperation gave the Political Directors
the opportunity  for the purpose of preparing the colloquies I of drawing to
the attention of the Foreign Ministers  proposals adopted by the European
Parliament on foreign policy questions..  Within its limits, this procedure
has had some usefulness, but the time is now ripe to take two further steps
beyond it  in o.cder to implement the des ire of -the Heads of Government to
associate the Parliament more closely with EPC 
New propos a 
54" In the first place, the Foreign Ministers should agree to consider at
their meetings on political cooperation items proposed by the Political
Affairs Committee It might well be that  in the course of a colloquy,
This proposal has already been put forward in the Draft Interim
Resolution 0n Inter-Institutional Relations  presented to Parliament I
Political Committee by Sir Peter Kirk..
PE 50..829jfina debate in Parliament or a discussion in the Committee, a matter arises
which Members feel should be discussed, if necessary with prior preparation
by the Political Cooperation Office, by the Foreign Ministers. If so, it
would be for Parliament to request the Presidency to give full consideration
to the inclusion of such matters on the agenda of the forthcoming EPC meetings
of Foreign Ministers.
55. Second, a statement should be made to Parliament, at its first session
following each European Council meeting, by the Head of State or of Govern-
ment chairing that meeting of the European Council. In this statement
both the political and economic aspects of the work of the Euxopean Council
should be explained, and questions put by Members of the Parliament could
be answerede In this way the European Council could be brought into a
formal and fruitful relationship with the European Parliament and some
degree of poli tical accountability developed from the European Council to
Par liament 1 
Conclusion
As has been said in the Introduction, the object of this report is to
ensure a proper degree of ParLiamentary control over the formulation of 
j oint European foreign policy. The main duties of Members of Par liament
are to influence and control both legislation and the policy-making process.
Members of the European Parliament are denied at almost every level the
opportunity of studying  influencing and controlling the joint foreign policy
of the Community and the Nine Member States  This is an intolerable
situation whi2h constitutes a denial of Parliamentary democracy and which
must be put right. At the same time , the introduction of new methods of
Parliamentary control should be carried out step by step, as is proposed in
the motion for resolution  The European Parliament, the Governments of
the Member States and the Commission must realise that this is a fundamental
matter and must treat it as one of high importance 
1 As proposed by Sir Peter Kirk in his Draft Report and Resolution on Inter-Institutional Relations submitted to Parliament I s Political
Committee"
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MACHINERY OF POLITICAL COOPERATION
l. The machinery of political cooperation was defined by the First and
Second Reports  on  the subject, made by the Foreign Ministers of the Six in
1970l and of the Nine in 1973
First (Luxembourg) Report on Political Cooperation
2. - The Ministers of Foreign Affairs are to meet at least twice eac~ year 
this meeting may be replaced by a Summit Conference (if the Ministers
believe that the circumstances are sufficiently serious or the
subjects to be dealt with important enough) 
- A ' Political Committee' consisting  of the Political Directors of the
Foreign Ministries will prepare these ministerial meetings in addition
to carrying out the tasks set in accordance with this
report;
- This Commi~tee will meet at least four times a year  it may set up
working parties and entrust special tasks to groups of experts 
- The ministerial meetings and the meetings of the Political Committee
will be chaired by the country which holds the presidency of the
Council of the European Communities;
- This country will also provide the Secretariat (which will therefore
change every six months) .
Second (Copenhagen) Report
3. The machinery established by the Second Report was
founded in part on existing procedures, which had developed since the First
Report  and in part on new procedures. As provided for by the 1972 Paris
Summit Conference the Foreign Ministers were to m6et four times a year
and to consult at other times  A group of ' correspondents ' on EPC was set
up, each Foreign Ministry nominating an official to be its ' co~r~spondent'
within the Davignon procedure  In addition ad  hoc working parties were
provided for, ' to ensure more thorough consultation on individual questions
' .
1 Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 11, 1970
2 Ibid, No. 9, 1973, section 1201, Appendix
3 Ibid, No. 10, 1972
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ei ther to groups of experts already occupied with current matters or to a
special analysis and research group of officials. The Embassies of the
Nine in the Member States were to receive information on political cooper-
ation and to hold consultations either at the seat of the Presidency 
elsewhere. Embassies in third countries were to be kept informed and to
prepare a common report if necessary, as were the permanent representatives
of the Member States to major international organisations. 5. The Presidency was given a more specific role than hitherto. It was
to be responsible for ensuring the implementation of conclusions adopted by
Ministers and by the Political Committee. It could propose consultations,
either on its own initiative or on that of another Member State. It should
also keep informed the Ambassadors of the Member States on the progress of
work on political cooperation. A special communications system was to be
established between the Nine Foreign Ministries (COREUNET)
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